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Climate policy – a task for generations
Global climate policy has gained prominence in
the last decade and culminated in the negotiation
of the Kyoto Protocol. It defines legally binding
greenhouse gas reduction targets for industri-
alised countries and some countries in transition
in the “commitment period” 2008 to 2012. They
are likely to be strengthened subsequently in
response to long-term reduction needs. In spite of
being referred to as “dead”by many stakeholders,
the Kyoto Protocol is alive and kicking and likely
to enter into force within the next year.
Industrialised countries will then face the chal-
lenge of implementing a policy mix that minimis-
es overall compliance costs for their national
economies.In a surprising move that made a lot of
American observers envious, the EU has become
a pioneer in emissions trading in less than three
years.
Two birds with one stone: efficiency and environ-
mental protection through emissions trading
While being a frontrunner in suggesting stringent
targets, the EU’s performance in introducing far-
reaching policy instruments has been disappoint-
ing as the slow burial of a common CO2-/energy
tax shows. After one decade of ad hoc policies
and reliance on the historical accidents of
German reunification and the British “dash for
gas”, it dawned on the Commission that current
national policies would not reach the EU’s Kyoto
commitment. In a courageous U-turn the
Commission decided that an internal emissions
trading system for large emitters provided the
only powerful and effective alternative to an
emissions tax.
Efficiency demands mandatory participation, as in
a voluntary system only those emitters can be
expected to participate who see themselves in a
seller’s position1, hence no market would emerge.
The direct inclusion of entities – be it installations
or companies – in emissions trading has several
advantages:
1. Emissions trading directly targets absolute
GHG-emissions, whereas emissions and energy
taxes as well as efficiency standards only have
indirect effects. Thus, governments would not
have to follow a “trial-and-error-process” to
reach their Kyoto target.
2. Entities can evaluate their internal reduction
potential much better than government. The
cost of emissions allowances will provide a clear
and simple incentive.
The inclusion of the Kyoto Mechanisms will fur-
ther and significantly reduce costs. Whereas price
estimates for a purely internal market range
between 18 and 33 q/t CO2, forecasts for world
market prices range from 2 to 8 q/t CO2.T h e
World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund pays about
3.5 q/t for millions of tons of CO2.
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1 Unless excessive (financial) incentives are provided.Equity: Can the third dimension of the trading
scheme be managed in the EU?
Surprisingly, resistance to emission trading has
come from industry stakeholders traditionally in
favour, mainly in Germany. It may be due to the
fear of absolute emissions targets and comparative
disadvantages,particularly compared to the United
States.However,many US companies call for clear,
long-term climate policy perspectives.Already sev-
eral regional GHG-emission trading schemes have
been set up.
Under grandfathering, the ex-ante-costs for partic-
ipants will be close to zero.The draft directive does
not require any concrete allocation formulas and
sets only broad criteria.National governments thus
have the freedom to consider special national cir-
cumstances,be it on the industrial or sectoral level.
Existing voluntary agreements can build the basis
for national allocation.
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After the EU Council of Environment Ministers
endorsed the Directive on Emissions Trading in
December 2002 the contra position seems to have been
consigned to history. Roma locuta, causa finita (Rome
has spoken, the campaign is over), emissions trading is
coming anyhow. Nevertheless, many questions which
would warrant further discussion remain open.
In order to set out the historical record one last time
the following should be noted.The chemical industry
has never formulated a contra position on environ-
mental conservation and on the careful husbanding of
energy but rather adopted from the outset a clear pro
position on ecological and economic grounds. Thus,
the European chemical industry set a target to reduce
CO2 equivalents by 30 percent from 1990 to 2010. In
Germany the chemical industry has already lowered
its energy-related emissions by 33 percent between
1990 and 2001.By 2012 it aims to reduce specific ener-
gy consumption by 35 to 40 percent and to achieve
absolute reductions in greenhouse gases causing glob-
al warming (CO2 equivalents) of 45 to 50 percent.
• The directive still involves considerable risks for
the affected companies.These threats do not arise
from trading in CO2 certificates but rather from
the upper CO2 limits which each EU Member
State must lay down for plants. The directive
indeed allows great freedom in the organisation of
national allocation plans for CO2 certificates. But,
in fact,the allocation has to be made in compliance
with the national burden-sharing targets of the
EU. Germany has committed itself to an absolute
reduction of all CO2 emissions of 21 percent with
respect to the base year, 1990. In reaching their
burden-sharing targets the EU and its Member
States are confronted with enormous challenges.
Only the United Kingdom and Germany are well
on the way to fulfilling their quotas.
• German industry will not be the vendor of certifi-
cates to other EU states.Although it has achieved
substantial reductions, these are counterbalanced
by unchecked emissions in the household and
transport sectors. The German federal govern-
ment will have to take this into account in accor-
dance with the provisions of the directive when
drawing up the national CO2 allocation plan.
• Individual EU states have already declared their
intention of buying CO2 certificates on the inter-
national market in order to protect the competi-
tiveness of their companies. However, neither in
the EU nor globally are procedures and financing
methods for this purpose regulated.A mandatory
requirement of companies for emissions trading
with third countries, however, is that internation-
al agreements have been concluded.
• The de facto objective of the directive is that
many of the companies covered by the directive
must buy CO2 certificates in order to maintain
production.They will certainly need to buy even
more certificates if they wish to continue grow-
ing. Since the EU Commission has already esti-
mated the costs at t 20 to 33 per metric ton of
CO2, the producing industry is threatened with
considerable additional costs.
• There is a further risk in that companies which
aim to or have to avoid additional costs will shift
their investments to third regions which have
either not ratified the Kyoto protocol or have no
reductions imposed on them by the Kyoto pro-
tocol. As a result, global CO2 emissions would
not drop, the sources of CO2 would only be
shifted from one region to another. This would
provide no remedy for the environment, either
in Europe or globally. The EU would only look
better in the CO2 statistics.
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